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With the rapid international spread of severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS) from March through May 2003,
Canada introduced various measures to screen airplane
passengers at selected airports for symptoms and signs of
SARS. The World Health Organization requested that all
affected areas screen departing passengers for SARS
symptoms. In spite of intensive screening, no SARS cases
were detected. SARS has an extremely low prevalence,
and the positive predictive value of screening is essentially
zero. Canadian screening results raise questions about the
effectiveness of available screening measures for SARS at
international borders. 
T
he first cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) in Canada were recognized almost simultane-
ously in Vancouver and Toronto. In Toronto, the index case
was diagnosed on March 13, 2003, when a cluster of
SARS cases was identified and traced back to a traveler
from Hong Kong, who arrived in Canada on February 23,
2003 (1). Two epidemic waves of SARS occurred in
Toronto (2), which resulted in a national total of 251 prob-
able cases with 43 deaths. 
In the period that followed the initial reports of this new
syndrome from Hong Kong and Vietnam, the disease
spread rapidly to other countries by international airline
travelers. On March 12, 2003, the World Health
Organization (WHO) issued a global health alert (3) in
response to the clusters of SARS in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, China, Vietnam (Hanoi City), and
Singapore. WHO recommended increased national and
international vigilance to recognize and report suspected
cases of SARS. Subsequently, on March 15, 2003, WHO
issued the first of several international travel advisories
that identified major locations where SARS transmission
was substantial and ongoing and advised international
travelers about travel to affected areas. On March 27,
2003, WHO recommended that affected areas begin
screening departing airline passengers for symptoms sug-
gestive of SARS.
Health Canada monitored the spread of this new syn-
drome through the WHO-Health Canada Global Public
Health Intelligence Network and regular communications
with other international and Canadian provincial and terri-
torial public health agencies. As soon as the rapid, interna-
tional spread of SARS became evident and after SARS
was imported into Canada, Health Canada undertook a
variety of measures designed to limit importation and
exportation of disease and the spread of the disease within
Canada. We describe the measures taken to mitigate the
spread of SARS and provide data on the effectiveness of
these measures.
Methods
Health Canada used a graduated, phased response to
additional imported SARS cases. The response consisted
of an information phase (March 18–May 14, 2003), a
screening phase (May 14–July 5, 2003), and a special
measures phase (March 13–July 5, 2003).
Information Phase
To mitigate the risk of importing SARS cases from
other internationally affected areas, Health Canada distrib-
uted passenger health alert notices (HANs) for incoming
passengers from affected areas in Southeast Asia on March
18, 2003. On arrival, posters directed passengers to pick up
health information about symptoms and signs of SARS
and advised them to consult a physician if a SARS-like ill-
ness developed after their arrival in Canada. This informa-
tion was printed in several languages on conspicuous,
yellow, 8 ½” x 11” paper (referred to as “yellow cards”)
and contained key telephone numbers.
The initial posters and yellow HANs were placed at
arrival sites in the Vancouver International Airport and
Toronto’s Pearson International Airport. They were quick-
ly made available in 12 other airports that received inter-
national passengers who might have traveled from the Far
East. HANs were provided to inbound passengers at 18
land border crossings between the United States and
Canada. No record was kept of how many passengers
picked up HANs.
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Health Canada implemented similar HANs in a different
color (cherry) to mitigate the risk of exporting SARS
cases. The cherry-colored HANs were distributed to per-
sons departing for international destinations from
Toronto’s Pearson International Airport. Passengers with
symptoms or signs of SARS were asked to self-defer their
travel. In these instances, Health Canada requested airlines
to waive their policies on nonrefundable tickets, and while
many did so, the refund and rescheduling policies and con-
ditions were not uniform. 
Screening Phase
Because of the continuing outbreak in Toronto, domes-
tic spread in other affected countries in Southeast Asia, and
international spread to other countries, Health Canada
intensified its initial response by instituting both inbound
and outbound passenger screening to identify persons with
symptoms or signs compatible with SARS. All passengers
were now required to obtain, read, and respond to ques-
tions on yellow or cherry HANs. Three questions were
added to both HANs: Do you have a fever? Do you have
one or more of the following symptoms: cough, shortness
of breath, difficulty breathing? Have you been in contact
with a SARS-affected person in the last 10 days? All pas-
sengers were required to circle “yes” or “no” responses.
Their responses were verified either by customs officials
(for inbound passengers) or by airline check-in agents (for
departing passengers from Toronto Pearson Airport).
Quality control checks (random sampling and spot checks
of prescribed procedures) were instituted to ensure com-
pliance by those responsible for verifying passenger
responses. For example, during a 1-week period, 82% of
departing passengers received a cherry card at check in,
and 73% were questioned about their responses by the
check-in ticket agent.
Secondary screening procedures were established for
all passengers who answered yes to any of the questions. It
was mandatory for any such passenger to be referred to a
screening nurse who administered a standard in-depth
questionnaire and protocol. The secondary screening pro-
tocol included reasons for assessment, symptoms present
at time of assessment, oral temperature, and defined crite-
ria for disposition. On the basis of the responses elicited in
the protocol, a passenger was released or referred to a pre-
determined hospital for an in-depth medical evaluation.
In parallel to these measures, Health Canada initiated a
pilot study on May 8, 2003, on the use of infrared thermal
scanning machines to detect temperatures >38°C in select-
ed international arriving and departing passengers at
Vancouver’s International and Toronto’s Pearson
International airports. Thermal scanning complemented
other measures in the overall screening process by helping
to triage the large volume of passengers who transit air-
ports. Any passenger with an elevated temperature reading
was referred to the screening nurse for confirmation, com-
pletion of the screening protocol, and referral to hospital,
if necessary. 
Special Measures
Passenger Contact Tracing
With previous documentation of transmission of tuber-
culosis on long flights (4,5), Health Canada initiated pas-
senger contact tracing to identify any secondary
transmission associated with air travel. Health Canada’s
protocols for airplane passenger contact tracing evolved
throughout the SARS outbreak and were updated as new
information became available. From March 13 to March
21, 2003, contact tracing of passengers included follow-
up of passengers seated in the same row, 2 rows in front,
and 2 rows behind someone with a probable case who was
symptomatic while in flight. As of March 22, airplane pas-
senger contact tracing was expanded to include persons
with suspected cases who were symptomatic while in
flight. As of March 31, contact tracing was expanded
again to include all passengers on a given flight with a
probable or suspected case who were symptomatic while
in flight (6). 
Because of the lack of internationally accepted stan-
dards for developing and retaining passenger manifests,
Health Canada personnel encountered excessive delays in
obtaining the manifests from various airlines. In response,
Health Canada initiated a traveler contact information
form that collected location information and that all
inbound passengers were required to complete before
arrival. Upon landing, all forms were collected from pas-
sengers by Health Canada personnel and retained for pos-
sible contact tracing if a case was subsequently identified.
The traveler contact information form reduced the time for
securing the manifest from weeks to 2 days.
All screening measures (HANs, thermal screening, and
traveler contact information form) continued after July 5,
2003, when WHO declared that SARS outbreaks had been
contained worldwide. This report only includes data up to
that date, when international movement of SARS was a
real possibility. 
Results
No attempt was made to evaluate the initial information
phase. Data were collected for the screening phase.
Table 1 summarizes the screening results for inbound and
outbound HAN screening measures. As of July 5, 2003, a
total of 1,172,986 persons received either yellow or cherry
HANs. A total of 2,889 persons answered yes to at least 1
screening question on the HAN and were referred to
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411 outbound passengers who were referred for secondary
screening in Toronto were asked to defer their travel.
All persons were cleared, and none were referred for
additional medical examination. In addition, 763,082 per-
sons (467,870 inbound and 295,212 outbound) were
screened by the thermal scanners (Table 2). Only 191 per-
sons had an initial temperature reading >38°C and were
referred for secondary evaluation. No data were collected
systematically to correlate thermal scanner results with
results of temperature taking by secondary screening nurs-
es. Some of the persons arriving or departing Toronto and
Vancouver airports were screened by both HAN and ther-
mal scanning measures. 
During this period, no screening measure put in place
by Health Canada detected any cases of SARS at border
entry points. Careful analysis of the travel histories of sus-
pected and probable SARS patients who traveled to
Canada showed that persons became ill after arrival and
would not have been detected by airport screening meas-
ures.
Table 3 summarizes the travel histories of persons
departing Canada whose ilnesses were subsequently diag-
nosed as SARS-like illness. Health Canada collaborated
with many international public health authorities to docu-
ment travel and illness histories of possible SARS patients
who departed Canada and whose illneses were diagnosed
and reported internationally (7–9). Health Canada investi-
gated >40 such reports, of which 11 are now attributed to
Canada (10). In all but 2 cases (cases 2 and 11), onset of
illness occurred after departure from Canada. Of these 11
persons who traveled from Canada, all met the WHO prob-
able SARS case definition. Only 3 of these case-patients
met the Canadian probable case definition. Another 3 case-
patients would meet the Canadian geo-linked case defini-
tion; 1 case met the Canadian “person under investigation”
category; and 4 case-patients did not meet any Canadian
SARS case definition. Of the 3 case-patients who did meet
the Canadian definition, none would have been detected by
exit screening. Only 2 (patients 2 and 11) of the 11 persons
had symptoms at the time of travel, but both would have
been cleared by the criteria established in the secondary
screening protocol. 
We identified 18 symptomatic probable or suspected
SARS patients on 29 flights (10 patients traveled on >2
flights). No documented transmission was identified.
Detailed results of Canada’s airplane passenger contact
tracing can be found elsewhere (6). 
Discussion
Patterns of international travel continue to increase in
complexity and volume. In Canada, >18 million persons
enter annually by air; 91% arrive at 6 international air-
ports. Similarly, a large number depart from several inter-
national airports. Additionally, because of an open land
border with the United States, ≈100 million persons cross
the land border in both directions annually. 
With travel to Canada from anywhere in the world tak-
ing  <24 hours, the possibility of detecting a dangerous
infectious disease at border points of entry is challenging.
Given the relatively short travel time, detecting persons at
the border who are incubating any of the known infectious
disease pathogens is unlikely. The absence of symptoms or
signs of infection and a corresponding lack of specific,
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detection of infectious diseases unlikely.
The effectiveness of screening measures for detecting
SARS cases at border points of entry was limited by 2 fac-
tors. First, screening measures themselves, i.e., HAN ques-
tionnaires and thermal scanning machines, were
nonspecific for SARS. Second, the prevalence of SARS
among international passengers arriving or departing from
Canada was low. For example, 5 SARS patients entered
Canada from March through May. None of these patients
had signs or symptoms during transit through airports. If
the same rate of entry were to continue for 1 year, then 20
cases might be expected among the 18 million persons
entering the country annually, for a prevalence of ≈1.1
SARS cases per 1 million passengers. For such a rare dis-
ease, the positive predictive value of a positive screening
result is essentially zero. The results demonstrate that
available screening measures are not effective for detect-
ing SARS. Despite extending screening measures to all
arriving air passengers, no SARS cases were identified.
These findings raise questions about whether such meas-
ures are effective tools for detecting and controlling the
spread of SARS, and whether, from a public health point
of view, other, more effective, strategies might exist.
Instituting infectious disease screening procedures at
border points of entry could have advantages. For exam-
ple, easily visible measures, such as thermal scanning
machines, may generate a sense of confidence or reassur-
ance that disease will be detected and prevented from
entering the country. No data are available to assess
whether or not the measures implemented at the airports
actually generated confidence or reassurance in the public.
Given the poor positive predictive value of available
SARS screening measures, any sense of reassurance might
be quickly dispelled when the first case is detected in spite
of screening measures.
We conclude that available screening measures for
SARS were limited in their effectiveness in detecting
SARS among inbound or outbound passengers from
SARS-affected areas. We suggest that in-country, acute-
care facilities (hospitals, clinics, and physicians’ offices)
are the de facto point of entry into the healthcare system
for travelers with serious infectious diseases. If a visitor or
returning citizen becomes ill after arriving in Canada, he or
she will likely seek medical care in clinics or emergency
rooms. Acute-care facilities must consider travel histories
of all patients with suspected infectious diseases and
implement standard precautions and infection control
measures. 
An estimated Can$7.55 million was invested in airport
screening measures from March 18 to July 5. Rather than
investing in airport screening measures to detect rare infec-
tious diseases, investments should be used to strengthen
screening and infection control capacities at points of entry
into the healthcare system. Additional useful measures
could focus on public education about infectious disease
prevention and care.
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